

NEW ZEALAND

Leaders' key role in crisis mitigation: The New Zealand government's response to 2019 terror attack.

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Abstract

Based on an analysis of New Zealand's government and its PM Jacinda Ardern's response to a terror attack in 2019 this chapter provides an inspiring example for the key role leaders play in crisis mitigation. It analyses socio-cultural factors that impact the crisis response as well as political lobbying and economic interests involved in the crisis. The analysis highlights the fact that in the cases of terror attacks the media tends to cooperate with political leaders and rally around the flag. The chapter emphasises the importance of crisis training for leaders to enable prompt response with appropriate emphatic and caring messages. The case demonstrates how leaders could use a crisis as an opportunity for a positive social change.

Introduction:

This chapter supports the observation of Bowers, Hall, and Srinivasan (2017) that based on their analysis of prominent organizational crisis cases stated: "Crisis management is all about culture and leadership" (p. 561). The chapter does so through an analysis of the New Zealand (NZ) government's response to the terror attack that took place on March 15, 2019, when an Australian white supremacist killed 51 Muslims during a prayer at two Christchurch mosques. It draws lessons from the leadership and communication of then-Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, focusing on her empathetic and

culturally inclusive approach, as well as her immediate use of the crisis as an opportunity for transformation and the prevention of future terror attacks.

In 2019, New Zealand (NZ) – Aotearoa (the Māori name for NZ) – had a population of almost 5 million people living on its two islands in the Southwest Pacific. It is known as a post-colonial, peaceful, democratic, and progressive nation with an extensive agricultural rural community. In fact, most of the population (84%) lived in or around four major cities.

Aotearoa ranks highly in many global comparisons of national performance for its quality of life and democratic open society (<https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019>, retrieved Oct 13). According to the government agency Statistics NZ, at the time of the terror attack, the major ethnic groups in New Zealand were residents and migrants of European origin (70%), Māori, the indigenous population (16.5%), Pacific Island people (8.1%), Asians (11.8%), Middle Eastern / Latin American / African (1.5%), and other ethnicities (1.2%) (<https://www.stats.govt.nz/news/ethnic-group-summaries-reveal-new-zealands-multicultural-make-up/>).

In presenting a description of the crisis and its analysis using the socio-cultural variables presented in Chapter 1, this chapter highlights that crisis mitigation often depends on the leader's values and commitment to public interest, as well as pre-crisis training and the ability to respond immediately, communicate effectively, and leverage the crisis for bringing about organizational and social change.

Description of The Crisis

On March 15, 2019, 51 people were killed and many more injured when an Australian right-wing white supremacist extremist opened fire at mosques in Christchurch, on New Zealand's South Island. The victims were from various countries including India, Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, and Somalia. The attacker, motivated by anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim beliefs, perpetrated the worst mass shooting in the country's modern history, shocking the small, peaceful nation (Ko tō tātou kāinga tēnei, 2020, Vol. 2). Acting alone, the Australian terrorist was the legal owner of five firearms, including two semi-automatic rifles, which he purchased in New Zealand shortly after arriving from Australia. He moved to New Zealand in 2017, two years before the attack, because at that time, New Zealand's relaxed gun laws enabled him to buy firearms that he could not legally obtain in Australia. He trained at a New Zealand gun club and meticulously planned the attack over time.

The terrorist killed worshippers at two mosques and was arrested by police on his way to the third one. Before the attack, he emailed politicians and media a 74-page "manifesto" with extreme, hateful, racist, anti-immigrant, and neo-Nazi messages. He also shared images of his weapons on social media, where he livestreamed part of the assault. Though the original video was deleted, millions of copies were shared online for an extended period.

Responsibility

According to Coombs (2012), a terror attack would be classified within a “victim cluster” since the organization— in this case, the New Zealand government— did not cause the crisis and could be seen as a victim of it, with no attribution of responsibility. However, one could argue that the 2019 terror attack was preventable, and that the government could have done more to protect its minority residents by changing its gun laws during the three decades leading up to the massacre.

In 1990, a 33-year-old New Zealander had randomly murdered 13 people in the small town of Aramoana. That crisis had sparked lengthy debate about gun control in New Zealand leading to a 1992 amendment to the regulations on military-style semi-automatic firearms (Thirteen shot dead at Aramoana, 1990). However, the legislation did not go far enough and did not introduce a registration system for gun owners. Australia’s experience offers an example of an alternative response: following mass shootings in the 1980s and 1990s, including the major killing of 35 people at Port Arthur in 1996, the Australian government swiftly changed its gun laws, including the introduction of a gun owners’ registration system, significantly reducing the risk of Australians dying from gunshots (Danziel, 2024; Wahlquist, 2016).

The failure of New Zealand’s governments to regulate gun ownership, under strong pressure from the local gun lobby, could be seen as partly responsible for the tragedy of the 2019 terror attack. What the Port Arthur trauma did for Australia, the Christchurch massacre eventually did for New Zealand—though decades later.

Government Response

A few hours after the March 15, 2019 attack, the then Prime Minister of New Zealand, Jacinda Ardern, delivered a media statement that inspired the nation's expressions of sorrow, empathy, and compassion toward the victims' families and the New Zealand Muslim community. In a BBC report six days after the attack, Nagesh (2019) described PM Ardern's response:

- She hugged the victims in Christchurch, wearing a black headscarf as a simple show of respect. She gave people the unifying cry "They are us"; and, addressing Parliament for the first time a few days later, she made a small but bold statement by opening her remarks with the Islamic greeting "As-Salaam Alaikum."
- But she combined this show of empathy with promises of concrete legislative and cultural change. A few hours after the attack, she announced a crackdown on the country's lax gun laws, saying that changes would happen "within 10 days." Speaking to the BBC's Clive Myrie, she promised to "weed out" racism both in New Zealand and globally.

The message PM Jacinda Ardern framed and broadcast immediately after the attack, "We are one, they are us," was repeated by New Zealanders in commemoration ceremonies, on billboards, and in chalk-written messages on streets all over the country. This message, along with her promise to eradicate racism, indicated to New Zealanders that the inclusion of the Muslim community was at the top of the nation's public agenda, despite the widespread global spread of anti-Muslim rhetoric.

According to Canel and Sanders (2010), “Evidence shows that the way governments frame a response shapes the attribution of responsibility by the public” (p. 462). PM Ardern’s frame of “they are us” indeed shaped the nation’s response to the attack. Muslims are a small minority in New Zealand, and they were overwhelmed by the support from New Zealanders. PM Ardern described it in her Ministerial Statement to Parliament four days after the attack: “The mountain of flowers around the country that lie at the doors of mosques, and the spontaneous songs outside the gates—these are ways of expressing an outpouring of love and empathy” (Transcript, NZ Parliament, 2019).

A gun control law that outlawed assault rifles was rapidly passed with support across the political spectrum, and further gun control legislation foreshadowed the possible establishment of a gun registry (see <https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/new-zealand-bans-military-style-semi-automatics-and-assault-rifles>). Since then, a buy-back program has spent millions of dollars taking guns out of circulation (Crothers & O’Brien, 2020, p. 248).

Following the Christchurch attack, the government worked with social media platforms to limit the transmission of footage of the attack. This initial response was followed by a proactive global strategy to stop terrorist publicity on social media and hold the companies that benefit from these platforms responsible.

Framing an emotional, inclusive, and responsible response, delivering it immediately after the attack, and then using the momentum as an opportunity to fix problems, enabled the leader to mitigate effectively a devastating terror attack.

Analysis

Political Culture and Leadership

According to the Freedom House report, “New Zealand is a parliamentary democracy with long record of free and fair elections and of guaranteeing political rights and civil liberties. Concerns include discrimination against Māori and other minority populations, as well as reports of foreign influence in politics and the education sector” (<http://freedomhouse.org/country/new-zealand>). In 2019, NZ scored 98 out of 100 on the Freedom House comparative list, and in 2024, it ranked 99 out of 100.

Prime Minister Ardern’s popularity enabled the return of the Labour Party to power in 2017, although it was restricted by a coalition agreement. In the 2020 elections, PM Ardern’s consistent ethical and empathic leadership during the 2019 crisis, natural disasters, and the government’s initial response to COVID-19 enabled her Labour Party to win the majority of parliamentary seats and govern without dependence on a coalition. The term “Jacinda mania” described the public admiration for the PM’s responses to adversities during those years, including her culturally inclusive and effective leadership during the 2019 massacre crisis.

In her response to the crisis, PM Ardern demonstrated what leadership scholars describe as “crisis exploitation” (Boin, McConnell, and t’Hart, 2008, 2009). The theory of crisis exploitation explains the use of crisis communication for political change. Similarly, Kouzes & Posner (2023) recommend that leaders “treat challenges as opportunities” (p. 303). They describe the responsibility of leaders “to inspire people to do things differently, to struggle against uncertain odds” (p. 304). Australia’s PM John Howard’s response to the 1996 Port Arthur massacre could serve as an example of crisis exploitation. Alpers & Zareh (2019) described the speed of the response as essential to the process of gun legislation:

The Port Arthur shootings, however, broke the cycle of policy stasis. On day one, Prime Minister Howard seized the momentum and acted swiftly to implement uniform gun laws (p. 228).

Over two decades later, NZ PM Ardern announced a ban on all military-style semi-automatics and assault rifles, six days after the terror attack. In previous years, the traditional gun lobby’s objection to restrictive gun legislation was vocal. Lianne Danziel, former Mayor of Christchurch and MP and Minister on behalf of Labour, said:

The decision to change the gun laws in 2019 was not unanimous. ACT leader David Seymour dismissed it as ‘political theatre.’ The Council of Licensed Firearms Owners led the opposition to the law changes, and they had a powerful advocate in Nicole McKee (Danziel, 2024).

Nicole McKee's statement to the media was: "We are not terrorists and should not be punished for what some nutter extremist who has come into our country has done" (AAP SBC News, 2019, 22.3). But the opposition to the PM initiative was not as strong this time and shocked New Zealanders supported the law change. The PM used the situation to legislate in the public's interest.

Different political leaders identify the public interest in different ways. Five years after the NZ Labour-led government's success in restricting the use of guns, the 2023 elected government, led by a right wing National party, is considering repealing the 2019 gun law changes. The new leadership, with a neoliberal agenda, included in its election campaign a commitment to revise the gun laws that the Labour-led government introduced following the Christchurch massacre. The former secretary of the Council of Licensed Firearms Owners, Nicola McKee, who had lobbied for years on behalf of the gun industry, was appointed in 2023 as Minister of Courts and Associate Minister of Justice in charge of firearms.

The new government also decided to halt the work of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terror attack and end coordinated services for the survivors. An opinion ad titled "'They are us' loses its lustre" stated that these decisions "undermined trust and the sense of belonging in the NZ Muslim community" (Arkilic & Lisdonk, 2024). Had the NZ government been led in March 2019 by the 2023-elected government, the response to the crisis would likely have been different. The political leaders' values and agendas play a key role in crisis mitigation.

Economic Interests

Government legislation surrounding guns is at the core of the 2019 NZ terror crisis, especially because the perpetrator came to New Zealand to buy firearms that he could not legally purchase in Australia. Government regulations on guns have both social and economic implications. According to Fortune Business Insights, “the global guns and accessories market size was USD 6.14 billion in 2019. North America dominated the guns and accessories market with a market share of 52.77% in 2019” (Defence Platforms, 2024). The U.S. is one of the major exporters of firearms globally, and New Zealand is part of that trade flow.

It is difficult to pinpoint a precise figure for the commercial value of the gun industry in New Zealand, but it is estimated that the industry generates tens of millions of dollars annually through the import and sale of firearms, mainly from U.S. companies. The gun market includes a significant number of farmers, rural communities, hunters, and participants in shooting sports. According to Corthers & O’Brien (2020), there are approximately 350,000 to 400,000 firearm users in NZ (p. 253).

The size of the gun market helps explain the persistent lobbying on behalf of companies that sell guns and accessories for profit. Lobbying and advocacy activities aiming to influence government policies and decisions are considered an important and legitimate feature of NZ democratic culture <https://www.justice.govt.nz/justice-sector-policy/key-initiatives/political-lobbying/>. The firearms lobby in New Zealand has systematically defeated every proposal for change over decades, until the 2019 attack. The lobby is

active in advocating for the rights of gun owners and promoting the legitimate use of firearms. Their arguments generally focus on residents' rights to self-defense, especially in remote rural areas where law enforcement presence can be sparse, the cultural significance of New Zealand's tradition of hunting and sport shooting, individual freedom, pest control, and agricultural needs.

It is clear that the major driver of pro-gun lobbying is the gun industry's commercial interests. The lobbyists represent groups such as the New Zealand Council of Licensed Firearms Owners (COLFO), the Sporting Shooters Association of New Zealand (SSANZ), and other interest groups. These groups often argue that the gun laws are ineffective, and that the vast majority of gun owners in New Zealand are not involved in crime. Yet, they claim, these owners are treated as potential threats due to the actions of a very small minority of extremists. For decades the lobby succeeded in delaying New Zealand government legislation, despite solid data from Australia providing evidence that legislation restricting the use of specific firearms significantly reduced the number of gun-related victims.

Societal Culture

As a post-colonial nation, Aotearoa-New Zealand's major social challenge focuses on relations between its majority group—European descendants and migrants—and the indigenous Māori group, which makes up about 16% of the population. Since the 1980s, the government has adopted a bicultural policy, recognizing the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi between Māori and the British Crown as a

founding document. The bicultural policy revived the Māori language and culture, acknowledged Māori traditions in official events, and made efforts to compensate Māori for the injustices they have experienced since colonial times. Not all New Zealanders welcomed the country's Māori identity and the government's affirmative action. Some believed that the policy did not go far enough and expected a more dominant status for Māori. The cultural identity of New Zealand and Māori rights are major topics on the nation's agenda and dominate political debates.

Reservations around biculturalism argue that New Zealand's multicultural reality should be recognized, and that all ethnic and religious groups living in New Zealand deserve equal rights. The 2019 massacre in Christchurch's mosques highlighted the needs of NZ's other minority groups. The fact that all victims of the terror attack were Muslims and the perpetrator was a white supremacist from Australia shaped a new public discourse about New Zealand's diverse society and culture. For example, following the 2019 terror attack, the public criticized one of NZ's top rugby union teams for its brand, "The Crusaders," and its logo depicting a knight and sword, as it was associated with medieval religious wars between Muslims and Christians. The team scrapped the logo but retained the name (Rech, 2019).

Public discourse following the terror attack was not only about the historical tensions between Europeans and Māori, but also about other ethnicities and religious groups. The violent attack on a minority group did not align with New Zealand's self-image as a tolerant and peaceful nation and also drew attention to the multicultural

rather than bicultural nature of NZ society. Muslims are a small minority, making up only 1.5% of the general NZ population. They have immigrated from the Middle East, South and East Asia, and Africa. The Royal Commission of Inquiry into the 2019 Terrorist Attack reported that the Muslim community complained about “racism, discrimination, and Islamophobia” (Young & Caine, 2020). The report also questioned the police’s lack of response to Muslims’ complaints to the NZ Police about threats to their safety.

After the attack, the community appreciated the compassion and support from NZ PM, the government, and the public. Testimonials reported by the Royal Commission of Inquiry were positive and grateful. There was a sense that this presented an opportunity to improve social cohesion, unity, and interconnectedness between communities (Young & Caine, 2020).

In her immediate response to the terror attack, PM Ardern vowed to combat and eradicate prejudice and racist approaches toward minorities, and her message “They are us” did improve social cohesion. However, the 2023 elected political leadership led by right-wing politicians did not express such a commitment. Social cohesion can be achieved through a long-term, well-planned government effort and depends on leadership commitment to this challenging process.

Media and Response to Terrorism

Terrorists are motivated by their need to gain publicity. They execute horrific attacks to communicate their messages to a large audience. Canel and Sanders (2010) explained that terrorists plan their attack to affect public opinion and governments

should “deploy public relations techniques to manage effectively their response to terrorist attacks (p. 451).

In 2019, Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern was already known for her exceptional communication and media relations skills (she held a bachelor’s degree in political science and public relations). Her immediate and strategic response was evaluated as exceptional.

A discourse of unity following a terror attack was mentioned in Canel and Sanders’ (2010) analysis of British PM Tony Blair’s communication following the July 7, 2005, bombing of London’s transport system. Their analysis observed that the British way of life valued tolerance and freedom, and that “His call to unity around these values... became hallmarks of the overall response to the bombing” (p. 458). Blair’s rhetoric “helped consolidate a universal us” (p. 460), a coming-together message to demonstrate the nation’s resilience. The 2019 NZ PM's frame “They are us” had a similar impact on New Zealanders. Interestingly, in 2005, Jacinda Ardern had worked in the Cabinet Office of PM Blair. Her “us” frame indicated inclusiveness and was considered trustworthy, empowering a national empathetic approach.

Ardern’s response was praised almost in unison by local and international media as a model for leadership communication during a crisis. A week after the attack, BBC News published an overview of global coverage:

- "Martin Luther King said genuine leaders did not search for consensus but moulded it" Suzanne Moore wrote in the British paper *The Guardian*. "Ardern has moulded a different consensus, demonstrating action, care, unity. Terrorism sees difference and wants to annihilate it. Ardern sees difference and wants to respect it, embrace it, and connect with it."
- The Washington Post's Ishaan Tharoor wrote that "Ardern has become the face of her nation's sorrow and grief, and its resolve" (Nagesh, 2019).

Studies indicate that the media coverage of terror attacks tends to avoid criticism of the government. Olsson, Nord, and Falkheimer's (2015) comparative study of crisis cases found that, in the case of terror attacks, "the government was portrayed in either neutral or positive tones to a larger extent than in the two other cases" (p. 170). Based on previous studies, they commented that "...when faced with acts of terror, journalists tend to abstain from criticizing leading political actors" (p. 169).

The media coverage of New Zealand's government response to the 2019 attack went beyond the tendency to rally around the flag and applauded the exceptional government communication during the stressful crisis. In Parliament the PM Ardern implored media to avoid mentioning the terrorist name and indeed NZ media avoided featuring the shooter or publish his name, and instead focused on the victims and societal issues. The exceptional media support enabled Arden's government to achieve bipartisan gun legislation within weeks.

Leaders as Activists

Political leaders who work to advance causes they deeply believe in often use their positions of power to challenge the status quo and advocate for significant change against powerful opposition. In such cases, they are practicing political activism. Barack Obama played an activist role advocating for racial equality in the US, and Justin Trudeau of Canada has championed gender equality, LGBTQ+ rights, and women's rights. Both did so as part of their political agendas, often pushing for social reforms that reflect progressive values.

Jacinda Ardern's response to the 2019 massacre developed into political activism on the global stage. The terrorist's abuse of social media highlighted a worldwide concern, and the PM used this as an opportunity for an international action plan. Addressing the New Zealand Parliament on March 19, 2019, PM Ardern presented her plan for an international joint policy regarding social media: "We cannot simply sit back and accept that these platforms just exist and that what is said on them is not the responsibility of the place where they are published. They are the publisher. Not just the postman. There cannot be a case of all profit, no responsibility. This of course doesn't take away the responsibility we too must show as a nation, to confront racism, violence, and extremism. I don't have all of the answers now, but we must collectively find them. And we must act." (Transcript, NZ Parliament, 2019).

Three months after the crisis, she met with French President Emmanuel Macron "to foster cooperation amongst governments, ICT companies, and other stakeholders to reduce the extent to which terrorist activity takes place and is publicized through the

internet” (<https://www.christchurchcall.com>). The main outcome of the call was a pledge signed by eight major internet providers and 48 countries to monitor extremism on the internet. Diplomatic work on developing effective programs to suppress extremist content and create better responses has continued since (Crothers & O’Brien, 2020, p. 249).

Under Ardern leadership New Zealand, a small country in the Pacific, fronted an international coalition seeking to limit some of the most dangerous social media encouragements to extremist violence. On May 15 2019 an international meeting of world leaders with high-profile executives from Google, Facebook and Twitter met in Paris and endorsed a commitment titled “the Christchurch call” aiming at curbing the spread of terrorist materials on the web. The fact that the Christchurch shooter posted a video of the attack and his “manifesto” online, and those materials were widely circulated despite effort to remove them, exposed the weakness of the social media companies and enabled the world leaders to challenge them. Ardern’s used the crisis momentum to drive a global reaction and to initiate a significant social change.

Discussion and Lessons Learned

The chapter demonstrated a leader’s key role in mitigating a crisis and exploiting it for positive social change. The analysis of New Zealand’s former PM Jacinda Ardern’s response to a terror attack provided an example of a leader’s effective mitigation of a crisis. Her success in transforming the negative impact of the crisis, unifying the nation, improving race relations, increasing social cohesion, and legislating for gun control can

be credited to her values and commitment to the public interest, as well as her pre-crisis training and ability to respond immediately, communicate effectively, and exploit the crisis for change.

This success was recognized globally at the time, particularly because, during the crisis, Ardern was only 39 years old and had a one-year-old baby at home. Her compassionate leadership style became exemplary. According to Nagesh (2019), “Sushil Aaron wrote in the New York Times that she 'is emerging as the definitive progressive antithesis to the crowded field of right-wing strongmen... whose careers thrive on illiberal, anti-Muslim rhetoric.' One clear example of this is her response to President Donald Trump when he asked her what support the US could provide: 'Sympathy and love for all Muslim communities,' she replied (Nagesh 2019).

Given her background and personality, it is reasonable to assume that former PM Ardern was well-trained in crisis management. The chapter highlighted examples that might have inspired her response: The Australian former PM John Howard’s swift change of gun laws following the Port Arthur massacre in 1996, and the former British PM Tony Blair’s socially inclusive messages in response to the 2005 terror attacks. These examples, in addition to her academic training in public relations, likely guided Ardern’s effective mitigation of the 2019 terror crisis. There are few national leaders with degrees in communication and this may be an instance of how that kind of training may foster the strategies and tactics used by the leader in a crisis. Pre-crisis training, which includes analysis of crisis cases, can improve leaders’ success in crisis management.

The chapter also demonstrated how different leaders might respond to crises in different ways, depending on their agendas, values, personalities, and world views. This is relevant not only to political leaders but also to leaders of organizations. Training leaders in crisis management should be considered for any newly appointed leader and their leadership team.

Olsson et al. (2015) argued that “crisis journalism has important implications for the political actor’s ability to exploit crises and thereby strengthen his/her support” (p. 170). Politicians might take advantage of the fact that during a crisis, the media depend mainly on government sources, which they can use to boost their popularity. Former PM Ardern’s communication and legislative initiatives following the terror attack were applauded on both the global and local stages and contributed to her re-election in 2020. But she “exploited” the crisis not so much for her personal political popularity but used it as an opportunity for making a significant social change (though it also helped her re-election in 2020). With her immediate action on gun legislation and her activism for responsible use of social media, she provides a positive model of crisis exploitation.

Johnson and Hackman (2018) discuss leaders’ responsibility for correcting the crisis damage by “taking steps to make sure that the problem doesn’t reoccur” (p. 458). They suggest that leaders should promote healing and emphasize a discourse of renewal based on an ethical foundation. To promote healing, leaders should “respond instinctively based on values and virtues (rather than on strategic communication designed to protect the group’s image)” (p. 465). The chapter provided an example of

the kind of ethical and empathic leadership that helped the victims of a terror attack deal with trauma and feel supported by their community.

Take aways for practitioners

The analysis of this crisis suggests practical lessons for crisis managers. It illustrates the key role of leaders—both political leaders and heads of corporations or non-profit organizations—in mitigating the outcomes of a crisis. A leader’s immediate, strategic, and well-communicated, responsible response can influence significant public support and follow-up. A crisis provides leaders with an opportunity to shine, demonstrate their resilience and problem-solving skills, express their values, and show care for victims. Leaders can exploit a crisis situation when the public tends to rally around the flag and can use it as a chance to make significant changes.

The case emphasizes the importance of crisis training, especially for political leaders and executive teams in organizations. Training reduces panic and enables an immediate reaction. Leaders should be trained in crisis communication to turn their reservations about the media into collaboration and effective messaging. They should learn to identify a crisis as an opportunity for change and for building organizational and community resilience to adversity.

The case analysis also suggests the usefulness of framing a unifying, empathic message to set the public agenda. Each crisis is different, and certainly, this advice is more relevant to terror attacks and cases in the “victim cluster,” where there is no

attribution of responsibility. However, finding a way to deliver positive messages during the dark times of a crisis can help mitigate the negativity associated with it.

An effective response to a crisis should combine rhetorical strategies with activities that aim to rectify the damage. Even when an organization is not blamed for causing the crisis, it must prove that it is “taking action to prevent future recurrence” (Holladay, 2010, p. 166). Johnson and Hackman (2018) echoed this idea by saying that effective crisis managers “help their organizations recover from the trauma and move forward” (p. 442). New Zealand PM Jacinda Ardern’s compassionate and inclusive messaging, her initiatives to use the crisis as an opportunity to change gun laws and to launch a global campaign aimed at restricting social media harms provide an inspiring example for leaders as well as crisis managers of the principle of “rectification” in crisis management.

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